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ABSTRACT
We propose a design-time framework (named HYDRA-C) for
integrating security tasks into partitioned1 real-time systems (RTS)
running on multicore platforms. Our goal is to opportunistically
execute security monitoring mechanisms in a ‘continuous’ manner
– i.e., as often as possible, across cores, to ensure that security
tasks run with as few interruptions as possible. Our framework
will allow designers to integrate security mechanisms without
perturbing existing real-time (RT) task properties or execution
order. We demonstrate the framework using a proof-of-concept
implementation with intrusion detection mechanisms as security
tasks. We develop and use both, (a) a custom intrusion detection
system (IDS), as well as (b) Tripwire – an open source data
integrity checking tool. These are implemented on a realistic rover
platform designed using an ARM multicore chip. We compare
the performance of HYDRA-C with a state-of-the-art RT security
integration approach for multicore-based RTS and find that our
method can, on average, detect intrusions 19.05% faster without
impacting the performance of RT tasks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Limited resources in terms of processing power, memory, energy,
etc. coupled with the fact that security was not considered a design
priority has led to the deployment of a large number of real-
time systems (RTS) that include little to no security mechanisms.
Hence, retrofitting such legacy RTS with general-purpose security
solutions is a challenging problem since any perturbation of the
real-time (RT) constraints (runtimes, periods, task execution orders,
deadlines, etc.) could be detrimental to the correct and safe operation
of RTS. Besides, security mechanisms need to be designed in such
a way that an adversary can not easily evade them. Successful
attacks/intrusions into RTS are often aimed at impacting the safety
guarantees of such systems, as evidenced by recent intrusions
(e.g., attacks on control systems [2, 3], automobiles [4, 5], medical
devices [6], etc. to name but a few). Systems with RT properties
pose unique security challenges – these systems are required
to meet stringent timing requirements along with strong safety
requirements. Limited resources (i.e., computational power, storage,
energy, etc.) prevent security mechanisms that have been primarily
developed for general purpose systems from being effective for
safety-critical RTS.
In this paper we aim to improve the security posture of RTS
through integration of security tasks while ensuring that the
existing RT tasks are not affected by such integration. The security
1In partitioned scheduling (a widely accepted multicore scheduling scheme), tasks are
statically partitioned onto identical cores (i.e., runtime migration across cores is not
permitted) [1].
Table 1: Example of Security Tasks
Security Task Approach/Tools
File-system checking Tripwire [17], AIDE [18], etc.
Network packet monitoring Bro [19], Snort [20], etc.
Hardware event monitoring Statistical analysis based
checks [21] using performance
monitors (e.g., perf [22],
OProfile [23], etc.)
Application specific
checking
Behavior-based detection (see
the related work [11–13, 24])
tasks considered could be carrying out any one of protection,
detection or response-based operations, depending on the system
requirements. For instance, a sensor measurement correlation task
may be added for detecting sensor manipulation or a change
detection task (or other intrusion detection programs) may be
added to detect changes/intrusions into the system. In Table 1 we
present some examples of security tasks that can be integrated into
legacy systems (this is by no stretch meant to be an exhaustive list).
Note that the addition of any security mechanisms (such as IDS,
encryption/authentication, behavior-based monitoring, etc.) may
require modification of the system or the RT task parameters as
was the case in prior work [7–15].
Further, to provide the best protection, security tasks may
need to be executed as often as possible. If the interval between
consecutive checking events is too large then an attacker may
remain undetected and cause harm to the system between two
invocations of the security task. In contrast, if the security tasks are
executed very frequently, it may impact the schedulability of the RT
(and other security) tasks. The challenge is then to determining the
right periods (i.e., minimum inter-invocation time) for the security
tasks [16].
As a step towards enabling the design of secure RT platforms,
opportunistic execution [25, 26] has been proposed as a potential
way to integrate security mechanisms into legacy RTS – this allows
the execution of security mechanisms as background services
without impacting the timing constraints of the RT tasks. Other
approaches have been built on this technique for integrating tasks
into both legacy and non-legacy systems [7–11, 27, 28]. However,
most of that work was focused on single core RTS (that are
a majority of such systems in use today). However, multicore
processors have found increased use in the design of RTS to improve
overall performance and energy efficiency [29, 30]. While the use
of such processors increases the security problems in RTS (e.g.,
due to parallel execution of critical tasks) [31] to our knowledge
very few security solutions have been proposed in literature [26].
In prior work (called HYDRA) [26] researchers have developed a
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mechanism for integrating security into multicore RTS. However
this work uses a partitioned scheduling approach and does not allow
runtime migration of security tasks across cores. We show that this
results in delayed detection of intrusions2 as the security tasks are
not able to execute as frequently. Our main goal in this paper is
to raise the responsiveness of such security tasks by increasing their
frequency of execution. For instance, consider an intrusion detection
system (IDS) – say one that checks the integrity of file systems. If
such a system is interrupted (before it can complete checking the
entire system), then an adversary could use that opportunity to
intrude into the system and, perhaps, stay resident in the part of the
filesystem that has already been checked (assuming that the IDS
is carrying out the check in parts). If, on the other hand, the IDS
task is able to execute with as few interruptions as possible (e.g.,
by moving immediately to an empty core when it is interrupted),
then there is much higher chance of success and, correspondingly,
a much lower chance of a successful adversarial action.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we propose a design-time
methodology and a framework named HYDRA-C for partitioned3
RTS that (a) leverages semi-partitioned scheduling [35] to enable
continuous execution of security tasks (i.e., execute as frequently as
possible) across cores, and (b) does not impact the timing constraints
of other, existing, RT tasks.
HYDRA-C takes advantage of the properties of a multicore
platform and allows security tasks to migrate across available
cores and execute opportunistically (i.e., when the RT tasks are not
running). This framework extends existing work [26] and ensures
better security (e.g., faster detection time) and schedulability (see
Section 5). HYDRA-C is able to do this without violating timing
constraints for either the existing RT tasks or the security ones
(Section 3). We develop a mathematical model and iterative solution
that allows security tasks to execute as frequently as possible
while still considering the schedulability constraints of other tasks
(Section 4). In addition, we also present an implementation on
a realistic ARM-based multicore rover platform (running a RT
variant of Linux system and realistic security applications). We then
perform comparisons with the state-of-the-art [26] (Section 5.1).
Finally, we carry out a design space exploration using synthetic
workloads and study trade-offs for schedulability and security.
Our evaluation shows that proposed semi-partitioned approach
can achieve better execution frequency for security tasks and
consequently quicker intrusion detection (19.05% faster on average)
when compared with both fully-partitioned and global scheduling
approaches while providing the same or better schedulability
(Section 5.2).
Note: We do not target our framework towards any specific
security mechanism – our focus is to integrate any designer-
provided security solution into a multicore-based RTS. In our
experiments we used Tripwire [17] (a data integrity checking
tool) as well as our in-house custom-developed malicious kernel
module checker to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach –
2We discuss this issue further in Section 5.
3Since this is the commonly used multicore scheduling approach for many commercial
and open-source OSs (such as OKL4 [32], QNX [33], RT-Linux [34], etc.) – mainly due
to its simplicity and efficiency [1, 26].
the integration framework proposed in this paper is more broadly
applicable to other security mechanisms.
2 MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
2.1 Real-time Tasks and Scheduling Model
Consider a set of NR RT tasks ΓR = {τ1,τ2, · · · ,τNR }, scheduled on
a multicore platform withM identical coresM = {π1,π2, · · · ,τM }.
Each RT task τr releases an infinite sequence of task instances,
also called jobs, and is represented by the tuple (Cr ,Tr ,Dr ) where
Cr is the worst-case execution time (WCET), Tr is the minimum
inter-arrival time (e.g., period) and Dr is the relative deadline.
The utilization of each task is denoted by Ur = CrTr . We assume
constrained deadlines for RT tasks (e.g., Dr ≤ Tr ) and that the task
priorities are assigned according to rate-monotonic (RM) [36] order
(e.g., shorter period implies higher priority).
All events in the system happen with the precision of integer
clock ticks (i.e., processor clock cycles), that is, any time t involved
in scheduling is a non-negative integer. In this paper we consider RT
tasks that are scheduled using partitioned fixed-priority preemptive
scheme [30] and assigned to the cores using a standard task
partitioning algorithm [1, 30]. We further assume that the RT tasks
are schedulable, viz., the worst-case response time (WCRT), denoted
as Rr , is less than deadline (e.g., Rr ≤ Dr ,∀τr ) and the following
necessary and sufficient schedulability condition holds for each RT
tasks τr assigned to any given core πm [1]:
∃t : 0 < t ≤ Dr and Cr +
∑
τi ∈hp(τr ,πm )
⌈
t
Ti
⌉
Ci ≤ t , (1)
where hp(τr ,πm ) denotes the set of RT tasks with higher priority
than τr assigned to core πm .
2.2 Security Model
Our focus is on integrating given security mechanisms abstracted
as security tasks into a legacy multicore RTS without impacting
the RT functionality of the RTS. While we use specific intrusion
detection mechanisms (e.g., Tripwire) to demonstrate our approach,
our approach is somewhat agnostic to the security mechanisms. The
security model used and the design of security tasks are orthogonal
problems. Since we aim to maximize the frequency of execution of
security tasks, security mechanisms whose performance improves
with frequency of execution (e.g., intrusion monitoring and
detection tasks) benefit from our framework.
3 SECURITY INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK
We propose to improve the security posture of multicore based RT
systems by integrating additional periodic security tasks (e.g., tasks
that are specifically designed for intrusion detection purposes).
We highlight that HYDRA-C abstracts security tasks and allows
designers to execute any given techniques. Our focus here is on
integration of a given set of security tasks (e.g., intrusion detection
mechanisms) in an existing multicore RTS without impacting
the RT task parameters (e.g., WCET, periods, etc.) or their task
execution order. In general, the addition of security mechanisms
may increase the execution time of existing tasks [7, 8] or reduce
schedulability [15]. As we mentioned earlier, our focus is on legacy
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Figure 1: Illustration of our security integration framework
for a dual-core platform: two RT tasks (blue and green)
are statically assigned to two cores (core 0 and core 1,
respectively). We propose to integrate a security task (red)
that will execute with lowest priority and can be migrated
to ether core (whichever is idle) at runtime.
multicore systems where designers may not have enough flexibility
to modify system parameters to integrate security mechanisms. We
address this problem by allowing security tasks to execute with
a priority lower than all the RT tasks, i.e., leverage opportunistic
execution [25, 26]. This way, security tasks will only execute during
the slack time (e.g.,when a core is idle) and the timing requirements
of the RT tasks will not be perturbed. However, in contrast to prior
work (HYDRA) [26] where the security tasks are statically bound
to their respective cores, in this paper we allow security tasks to
continuously migrate at runtime (i.e., the combined taskset with
RT and security tasks follows a semi-partitioned scheduling policy)
whenever any core is available (e.g., when other RT or higher-
priority security tasks are not running). An illustration of HYDRA-
C is presented in Fig. 1 where two RT tasks (represented by blue
and green rectangles) are partitioned into two cores and a newly
added security task (red rectangle) can move across cores.
As we shall see in Section 5, allowing security tasks to execute
on any available core will give us the opportunity to execute
security tasks more frequently (e.g., with shorter period) and that
leads to better responsiveness (faster intrusion detection time).
One fundamental question with our security integration approach
is to figure out how often to execute security tasks so that the
system remains schedulable (e.g.,WCRT is less than period), and
also can execute within a designer provided frequency bound
(so that the security checking remains effective). This is different
when compared to scheduling traditional RT tasks since the RT
task parameters (e.g., periods) are often derived from physical
system properties and cannot be adjusted due to control/application
requirements. We now formally define security tasks.
Security Tasks. Let us include a set of NS security tasks ΓS =
{τ1,τ2, · · · ,τNS } in the system. We adopt the periodic security
task model [25] and represent each security task by the tuple
(Cs ,Ts ,Tmaxs ) where Cs is the WCET, Ts is the (unknown) period
(e.g., 1Ts is the monitoring frequency) and T
max
s is a designer
provided upper bound of the period – if the period of the security
task is higher than Tmaxs then the responsiveness is too low and
security checking may not be effective.
We assume that priority of the security tasks are distinct and
specified by the designers (e.g., derived from specific security
requirements). Security tasks have implicit deadlines, i.e., they need
to finish execution before the next invocation. We also assume that
task migration and context switch overhead is negligible compared
to WCET of the task. Our goal here is to find a minimum period
Ts ≤ Tmaxs (so that the security tasks can execute more frequently)
such that the taskset remains schedulable (e.g., ∀τs ∈ ΓS : Rs ≤ Ts
where Rs is the WCRT4 of τs ).
4 PERIOD SELECTION
The actual periods for the security tasks are not known – we need
to find the periods that ensures schedulability and gives us better
monitoring frequency. Mathematically this can be expressed as
the following optimization problem: minimize
Ts ,∀τs ∈ΓS
∑
τs ∈ΓS
Ts , subject to
Rs ≤ Ts ≤ Tmaxs ,∀τs ∈ ΓS . This is a non-trivial problem since the
period of τs can be anything in [Rs ,Tmaxs ] and the response time
Rs is variable as it depends on the period of other higher priority
security tasks. We first derive the WCRT of the security tasks and
use it as a (lower) bound to find the periods. Our WCRT calculation
for security tasks is based on the existing iterative analysis for
global multicore scheduling [37–39] and we modify it to account
the fact that RT tasks are partitioned.
4.1 Preliminaries
We start by briefly reviewing the relevant terminology and
parameters. We are interested in determining the response time
of a job τks of task τs (e.g., job under analysis) using an iterative
method and the response time in each iteration is denoted by x .
Definition 1 (Busy Period). The busy period of τks is the maximal
continuous time interval [t1, t2) (until τks finishes) where all the
cores are executing either higher priority tasks or τks itself.
Definition 2 (Interference). Given task τi , the interference Iτs←τi
caused by τi on τks is the number of time units in the busy period
when τi executes while τks does not.
Note that the job under analysis τks cannot execute if all cores
are busy with higher priority tasks; hence, the length of the busy
period is at most
⌊
Ωs
M
⌋
+ Cs by definition, where Ωs is the sum
of the interference caused by all higher priority tasks on τks . To
compute the value of Iτs←τi , we rely on the concept of workload.
Definition 3 (Workload). The workload Wi (x) of a task τi in a
window of length x represents the accumulated execution time of
τi within this time interval.
It remains to compute the workload and corresponding
interference for each higher priority task τi . We first show how to
do so for RT tasks and then for security tasks with higher priority
than τs .
4.2 Interference Calculation for RT Tasks
Since RT tasks are statically partitioned to cores and they have
higher priority than any task that is allowed to migrate between
cores, the worst-case workload for RT tasks can be trivially obtained
4The calculation of WCRT is presented in Section 4.4.
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based on the same critical instant used for single core fixed-priority
scheduling case [36].
Lemma 1. For a given core πm , the maximum workload of RT tasks
executed on πm in any possible time interval of length x is obtained
when all RT tasks are released synchronously at the beginning of the
interval.
Proof. Since RT tasks are partitioned and they have higher
priorities than security tasks, the schedule of RT tasks executed on
πm does not depend on any other task in the system. Now consider
any interval [t , t + x) of length x . We show that we can obtain an
interval [t ′, t ′ + x) where all tasks are released at t ′, such that the
workload of RT tasks on πm is higher in [t ′, t ′ + x) compared to
[t , t + x).
First step: let t ′ be the earliest time such that πm continuously
executes RT tasks in [t ′, t); if such time does not exist, then let
t ′ = t . By definition, πm does not execute RT tasks at time t ′ − 1.
Also since RT tasks continuously execute in [t ′, t), the workload
of RT tasks in [t ′, t ′ + x) cannot be smaller than the workload in
[t , t + x).
Second step: since πm is idle at t ′ − 1, no job of RT tasks on
πm released before t ′ can contribute to the workload in [t ′, t).
Hence, the workload can be maximized by anticipating the release
of each RT task τr so that it corresponds with t ′. This concludes
the proof. □
Let ΓπmR ⊆ ΓR denote the set of RT tasks partitioned to core πm .
Based on Lemma 1, an upper bound to the workload of RT tasks on
πm can be obtained by assuming that each RT task τr is released at
the beginning of the interval and each job of τr executes as early
as possible after being released, as shown in Fig. 2. We thus obtain
the workload for RT task τr :
W Rr (x) =
⌊
x
Tr
⌋
Cr + min(x mod Tr ,Cr ), (2)
and summing over all RT tasks on πm yields a total workload∑
τi ∈ΓπmR
W Ri (x). Finally, we notice that by definition the interference
caused by a group of tasks executing on the same core πm on
τs cannot be greater than x − Cs + 1. Therefore, the maximum
interference caused by RT tasks on πm to τs can be bounded as:
Iτs←ΓπmR
(
x ,
∑
τi ∈ΓπmR
W Ri (x)
)
= min
©­­«
∑
τi ∈ΓπmR
W Ri (x),x −Cs + 1
ª®®¬ . (3)
The ‘+1’ term in the upper bound of the interference (e.g., Eq. (3))
ensures the convergence of iterative search for the response time
(recall from Section 4.1 that at each iteration the response time
is denoted by x) to the correct value [40]. For example, when the
iterative search for the response time is started with x = Cs (i.e.,
Time
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Figure 3: Extension of busy period for bounding the number
of carry-in higher priority security tasks.
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Figure 4: Illustration of carry-in task for a window of size x .
x − Cs = 0), the search would stop immediately (and outputs an
incorrect WCRT) since min
( ∑
τi ∈ΓπmR
W Ri (x),x −Cs
)
= 0.
4.3 Interference Calculation for Security Tasks
Wenext consider the workload of security tasks with higher priority
than τs . The workload computation depends on the arrival time of
the task relative to the beginning of the busy period, as specified in
the following definition.
Definition 4 (Carry-in). A task τi is called a carry-in task if there
exists one job of τi that has been released before the beginning of a
given time window of length x and executes within the window. If
no such job exists, τi is referred to as a non-carry-in task.
Generally (but not always), the workload of a task τi in the
busy period is higher if τi is a carry-in task than a non-carry-in
task. Hence, it is important to limit the number of higher priority
carry-in tasks. To this end, we follow an approach similar to prior
research [37, 39] and extend the busy period of τks from its arrival
time (denoted by as ) to an earlier time instance t0 (see Fig. 3)
such that during any time instance t ∈ [t0,as ) all cores are busy
executing tasks with higher priority than τs . Note that by definition,
this implies that there was at least one free core (i.e., not executing
higher priority tasks) at time t0 − 1.
Lemma 2. At mostM − 1 higher priority tasks can have carry-in
at time t0.
Proof. The maximum number of higher priority tasks that can
have carry-in at t0 is M − 1 since by definition there have to be
strictly less than M higher priority tasks active at time t0 − 1
(otherwise they will occupy all the cores). □
Since Lemma 2 holds for all tasks with higher priority than τs ,
an immediate corollary is that the number of security tasks with
carry-in at t0 also cannot be larger thanM − 1. If a security task τi
does not have carry-in, its workload is maximized when the task
is released at the beginning of the busy interval. Hence, we can
calculate the workload boundW SNCi (x) for the interval x using
Eq. (2), e.g.,W SNCi (x) =
⌊
x
Ti
⌋
Ci +min(x modTi ,Ci ). Likewise, the
workload bound for a carry-in security task τi in an interval of
length x starting at t0 is given by (see Fig. 4):
W SCIi (x) =W SNCi (max(x − x¯i , 0)) + min(x ,Ci − 1), (4)
4
where x¯i = Ci − 1+Ti −Ri . We can bound the workload of the first
carry-in job toCi −1 because the job must have started executing at
the latest at t0 − 1 (given that not all cores are busy). Finally, using
the same argument as in Section 4.2, the interference of τi can be
bounded as follows:
Iτs←τi (x ,Wi (x)) = min (Wi (x),x −Cs + 1) , (5)
whereWi (x) is eitherW SNCi (x) orW SCIi (x). Notice that the WCRT
and periods of security task in the carry-in workload function (see
Eq. (4)) is actually an unknown parameter. However, we follow an
iterative scheme that allows us to calculate the period andWCRT of
all higher priority security tasks before we calculate the interference
for task τs (refer to Section 4.5 for details).
4.4 Response Time Analysis
Let hpS (τs ) denote the set of security tasks with a higher priority
than τs . Note that we do not know which (at most)M − 1 security
tasks in hpS (τs ) have carry-in. In order to derive the WCRT of τs ,
let us defineZτs ⊂ Γ × Γ as the set of all partitions of hpS (τs ) into
two subsets ΓNCs and ΓCIs (e.g., the non overlapping set of carry-in
and non-carry-in tasks) such that:
ΓNCs ∩ ΓCIs = ∅, ΓNCs ∪ ΓCIs = hpS (τs ), and |ΓCIs | ≤ M − 1,
e.g., there are at mostM − 1 carry-in tasks.
For a given carry-in and non-carry-in set (e.g., ΓNCs and ΓCIs ),
we can calculate the total interference experienced by τs as follows:
Ωs (x , ΓNCs , ΓCIs ) =
∑
πm ∈M
Iτs←ΓπmR
(
x ,
∑
τi ∈ΓπmR
W Ri (x)
)
+
∑
τi ∈ΓNCs
Iτs←τi
(
x ,W SNCi (x)
)
+
∑
τi ∈ΓCIs
Iτs←τi
(
x ,W SCIi (x)
)
. (6)
For a given ΓNCs , ΓCIs sets response time Rs |(ΓNCs ,ΓCIs ) will be
the minimal solution of the following iteration5 [37]:
x =
⌊
Ωs (x , ΓNCs , ΓCIs )
M
⌋
+Cs . (7)
We can solve this using an iterative fixed-point search with the
initial condition x (0) = Cs . The search terminates if there exists a
solution (i.e., x = x (k ) = x (k−1) for some iteration k) or when x (k ) >
Tmaxs for any iteration k since τs becomes trivially unschedulable
for WCRT greater than Tmaxs . Finally we can calculate the WCRT
of τs as follows:
Rs = max(ΓNCs ,ΓCIs )∈Zτs
Rs |(ΓNCs ,ΓCIs ). (8)
4.5 Algorithm
The security task τs remains schedulable with any period Ts ∈
[Rs ,Tmaxs ]. However as mentioned earlier, the calculation of Rs
requires us to know the period and response time of other high
priority tasks τh ∈ hpS (τs ). Also if we arbitrarily setTs = Rs (since
this allows us to execute security tasks more frequently) it may
negatively affect the schedulability of other tasks that are at a lower
priority than τs because of a high degree of interference from τs .
5Note that the worst-case is when the job arrives at t0 (i.e., as = t0).
Algorithm 1 Period Selection
Input: Set of real-time and security tasks Γ = ΓR ∪ ΓS
Output: Periods of the security tasks, T (if the security tasks are schedulable);
Unschedulable otherwise
1: Set Ts := Tmaxs and calculate Rs for ∀τs ∈ ΓS
2: if ∃τs such that Rs > Tmaxs then
3: return Unschedulable
4: end if
5: for each security task τs ∈ ΓS (from higher to lower priority) do
6: /* Find period for which all lower priority tasks are schedulable */
7: Find minimum T ∗s ∈ [Rs , Tmaxs ] using Algorithm 2 such that ∀τj ∈ lp(τs )
remains schedulable (e.g., Rj ≤ Tmaxj )
8: Update Rj for ∀τj ∈ lp(τs ) considering the interference with new periodT ∗s
9: end for
10: return T := [T ∗s ]∀τs ∈ΓS /* return the periods */
Hence, we developed an iterative algorithm that gives us a trade-off
between schedulability and monitoring frequency.
Our proposed solution (refer to Algorithm 1 for a formal
description) works as follows.We first fix the period of each security
task Tmaxs and calculate the response time Rs using the approach
presented in Section 4.3 (Line 1). If there exists a task τj such that
Rj > Tmaxj we report the taskset as unschedulable (Line 2) since
it is not possible to find a period for the security tasks within the
designer provided bounds – this unschedulability result will help
the designer in modifying the requirements (and perhaps RT tasks’
parameters, if possible) accordingly to integrate security tasks for
the target system. If the taskset is schedulable with Tmaxs , we then
iteratively optimize the periods from higher to lower priority order
(Lines 5-9) and return the period (Line 10). To be specific, for each
task τs ∈ ΓS we perform a logarithmic search [41, Ch. 6] (see
Algorithm 2 for the pseudocode) and find the minimum period T ∗s
within the range [Rs ,Tmaxs ] such that all low priority tasks (denoted
as lp(τs )) remain schedulable, e.g., ∀τj ∈ lp(τs ) : Rj ≤ Tmaxj (Line
7). Note that since we perform these steps from higher to lower
priority order, WCRT and period of all higher priority tasks (e.g.,
∀τh ∈ hp(τs )) are already known. We then update the response
times of all low priority task τj ∈ lp(τs ) considering the interference
from the newly calculated period T ∗s (Line 8) and repeat the search
for next security task.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluate HYDRA-C on two fronts: (i) a proof-of-concept
implementation on an ARM-based rover platform with security
applications – to demonstrate the viability of our scheme in a
realistic setup (Section 5.1); and (ii) with synthetically generated
workloads for broader design-space exploration (Section 5.2). Our
implementation code will be made available in a public, open-
sourced repository [42].
5.1 Experiment with an Embedded Platform
and Security Applications
5.1.1 Platform Overview. We implemented our ideas on a
rover platform manufactured by Waveshare [43]. The rover
hardware/peripherals (e.g., wheel, motor, servo, sensor, etc.) are
controlled by a Raspberry Pi 3 (RPi3) Model B [44] SBC (single
board computer). The RPi3 is equipped with a 1.2 GHz 64-bit
quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 CPU on top of Broadcom BCM2837
5
Algorithm 2 Calculation of Minimum Feasible Period for the
Security Task τs
Input: Set of real-time and security tasks Γ = ΓR ∪ ΓS
Output: A feasible period T ∗s for the security task under analysis (i.e., τs )
1: Define T ls := Rs , T rs := Tmaxs , T cs := 0
2: Set T̂s := {Tmaxs } /* Initialize a variable to store the set of feasible periods */
3: while T ls <= T rs do
4: Update T cs := ⌊ T
l
s +T
r
s
2 ⌋
5: if ∃τj ∈ lp(τs ) such that τj is not schedulable with Ts = T cs then
6: /* Increase the period of τs to make the taskset schedulable (e.g., by reducing
the interference) */
7: Update T ls := T cs + 1
8: else
9: /* Taskset is schedulable with T cs */
10: T̂s := T̂s ∪ {T cs } /* Add T cs to the feasible period list */
11: /* Check schedulability with smaller period for next iteration */
12: Update T rs := T cs − 1
13: end if
14: end while
15: Set T ∗s := min
(
T̂s
)
/* Find the minimum period from the set of feasible periods */
16: return T ∗s /* return the period of τs */
SoC (system-on-chip). In our experiments we focus on a dual-
core setup (e.g., activated only core0 and core1) and disabled the
other two cores) – this was done by modifying the boot command
file /boot/cmdline.txt and set the flag maxcpus=2. The base
hardware unit of the rover is connected with RPi3 using a 40-pin
GPIO (general-purpose input/output) header. The rover supports
omni-directional movement and can move avoiding obstacles using
an infrared sensor (e.g., ST188 [45]).We also attached a camera (RPi3
camera module) that can capture static images (3280 × 2464 pixel
resolution). The detailed specifications of the rover hardware (e.g.,
base chassis, adapter, etc.) are available on the vendor website [43].
5.1.2 Experiment Setup and Implementation. We implemented
our security integration scheme in Linux kernel 4.9 and enabled
real-time capabilities by applying the PREEMPT_RT patch [34]
(version 4.9.80-rt62-v7+). In our experiments the rover moved
around autonomously and periodically captured images (and stored
them in the internal storage). We assumed implicit deadlines for
RT tasks and considered two RT tasks: (a) a navigation task – that
avoids obstacles (by reading measurements from infrared sensor)
and navigates the rover and (b) a camera task that captures and
stores still images. We do not make any modifications to the vendor
provided control codes (e.g., navigation task). In our experiments
we used the following parameters (Cr ,Tr ): (240, 500) ms and
(1120, 5000) ms, for navigation and camera tasks, respectively (i.e.,
total RT task utilization was 0.7040). We calculated the WCET
values using ARM cycle counter registers (CCNT) and set periods
in a way that the rover can navigate and capture images without
overloading the RPi3 CPU. Since CCNT is not accessible by default,
we developed a Linux loadable kernel module and activated the
registers so that our measurement scripts can access counter values.
To integrate security into this rover platform, we included two
additional security tasks: (a) an open-source security application,
Tripwire [17], that checks intrusions in the image data-store and
(b) our custom security task that checks current kernel modules
(as a preventive measure to detect rootkits) and compares with an
expected profile of modules. The WCET of the security tasks were
5342 ms and 223 ms, respectively and the maximum periods of
Table 2: Summary of the Evaluation Platform
Artifact Configuration/Tools
Platform 1.2 GHz 64-bit Broadcom BCM2837
CPU ARM Cortex-A53
Memory 1 Gigabyte
Operating System Debian Linux (Raspbian Stretch Lite)
Kernel version Linux Kernel 4.9
Real-time patch PREEMPT_RT 4.9.80-rt62-v7+
Kernel flags CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT_FULL enabled
Boot parameters maxcpus=2, force_turbo=1,
arm_freq=700, arm_freq_min=700
WCET measurement ARM cycle counter registers
Task partition Linux taskset
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Figure 5: Experiments with rover platform: (a) time (cycle
counts) to detect intrusions; (b) average number of context
switches. On average our scheme can detect the intrusions
faster without impacting the performance of RT tasks.
security tasks were assumed to be 10000 ms (e.g., total system
utilization is at least 0.7040 + 0.5565 = 1.2605) – we picked
this maximum period value by trial and error so that the taskset
became schedulable for demonstration purposes. We used the Linux
taskset utility [46] for partitioning tasks to the cores and the
tasks were scheduled using Linux native sched_setscheduler()
function. For accuracy of our measurements we disabled all CPU
frequency scaling features in the kernel and executed RPi with a
constant frequency (e.g., 700 MHz – the default value). The system
configurations and tools used in our experiments are summarized
in Table 2.
We compared the performance of our scheme with prior work,
HYDRA [26]. In that work, researchers proposed to statically
partition the security tasks among the multiple cores – to
our knowledge HYDRA is the state-of-the-art mechanism for
integrating security in legacy multicore-based RT platforms. The
key idea in HYDRA was to allocate security tasks using a greedy
best-fit strategy: for each task, allocate it to a core that gives
maximum monitoring frequency (i.e., shorter period) without
violating schedulability constraints of already allocated tasks.
5.1.3 Experience and Evaluation. We observed the performance
of HYDRA-C by analyzing how quickly an intrusion can be detected.
We considered the following two realistic attacks6: (i) an ARM
6Note: our focus here is on the integration of any given security mechanisms rather
the detection of any particular class of intrusions. Hence we assumed that there were
no zero-day attacks and the security tasks were able the detect the corresponding
attacks correctly (i.e., there were no false-positive/negative errors) – although the
6
Table 3: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Values
Process cores,M {2, 4}
Number of real-time tasks, NR [3 ×M, 10 ×M]
Number of security tasks, NS [2 ×M, 5 ×M]
Period distribution (RT and security tasks) Log-uniform
RT task allocation Best-fit
RT task period, Tr [10, 1000] ms
Maximum period for security tasks, Tmaxs [1500, 3000] ms
Minimum utilization of security tasks At least 30% of
RT tasks
Base utilization groups 10
Number of taskset in each configuration 250
shellcode [47] that allows the attacker to modify the contents of
the image data-store – this attack can be detected by Tripwire; (ii) a
rootkit [48] that intercepts all the read() system calls – our custom
security task can detect the presence of the malicious kernel module
that is used to inject the rootkit. For each of our experimental trials
we launched attacks at random points during program execution
(i.e., from the RT tasks) and used ARM cycle counters to measure
the detection time. In Fig. 5a we show the average time to detect
both the intrusions (in terms of cycle counts, collected from 35
trials) for HYDRA-C and HYDRA schemes. From our experiments
we found that, on average, our scheme can detect intrusions 19.05%
faster compared to the HYDRA approach (Fig. 5a). Since our scheme
allows security tasks to migrate across cores, it provides smaller
response time (e.g., shorter period) in general and that leads to
faster detection times.
We next measured the overhead of our security integration
approach in terms of number of context switches (CS). For each of
the trials we observed the schedule of the RT and security tasks for
45 seconds and counted the number of CS using the Linux perf
tool [22]. In Fig. 5b we show the number of CS (y-axis in the figure)
for HYDRA-C and HYDRA schemes (for 35 trials). As shown in
the figure, our approach increases the number of CS (since we
permit migration across cores) compared to the other scheme that
statically partitions security tasks. From our experiments we found
that, on average, our scheme increases CS by 1.75 times. However,
this increased CS overhead does not impact the deadlines of RT tasks
(since the security tasks always execute with a priority lower than
the RT tasks) and thus may be acceptable for many RT applications.
5.2 Experiment with Synthetic Tasksets
We also conducted experiments with (randomly generated)
synthetic workloads for broader design-space exploration.
5.2.1 Taskset Generation and Parameters. In our experiments
we used parameters similar to those in related work [15, 25, 26,
38, 49, 50] (see Table 3). We consideredM ∈ {2, 4} cores and each
taskset instance contained [3 ×M, 10 ×M] RT and [2 ×M, 5 ×M]
security tasks. To generate tasksets with an even distribution of
tasks, we grouped the real-time and security tasksets by base-
utilization from [(0.01 + 0.1i)M, (0.1 + 0.1i)M] where i ∈ Z, 0 ≤
generic framework proposed in this paper allows the designers to accommodate any
desired security (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention) technique.
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Figure 6: Euclidean distance between achievable period and
maximum period vectors for different utilizations. Larger
distance (y-axis in the figure) implies security tasks execute
more frequently.
i ≤ 9. Each utilization group contained 250 tasksets (e.g., total
10 × 250 = 2500 tasksets were tested for each core configuration).
We only considered the schedulable tasksets (e.g., the condition
in Section 2.1 was satisfied for all RT tasks) – since tasksets that
fail to meet this condition are trivially unschedulable. Task periods
were generated according to a log-uniform distribution. Each RT
task had periods between [10, 1000] ms and the maximum periods
for security tasks were selected from [1500, 3000] ms. We assumed
that RT tasks were partitioned using a best-fit [1] strategy and
the total utilization of the security tasks was at least 30% of the
system utilization. For a given number of tasks and total system
utilization, the utilization of individual tasks were generated using
Randfixedsum algorithm [51].
5.2.2 Impact on Inter-Monitoring Interval. We first observe how
frequently we can execute (schedule) security tasks compared to
the designer specified bound (Fig. 6). The x-axis of Fig. 6 shows
the normalized utilization UM where U is the minimum utilization
requirement and given as follows:U =
∑
τr ∈ΓR
Cr
Tr +
∑
τs ∈ΓS
Cs
Tmaxs
. The
y-axis represents the Euclidean distance between the calculated
period vector T∗ = [T ∗s ]∀τs ∈ΓS and maximum period vector Tmax =
[Tmaxs ]∀τs ∈ΓS (normalized to 1). A higher distance implies that
tasks can run more frequently. As we can see from the figure for
higher utilizations, the distance reduces (e.g., periods are closer to
the maximum value) – this is mainly due to the interference from
higher priority (RT and security) tasks. The results from this figure
suggest that we can execute security tasks more frequently for low
to medium utilization cases.
5.2.3 Impact on Schedulability and Security Trade-off. While in
this work we consider a legacy RT system (i.e., where RT tasks
are partitioned to respective cores), for comparison purposes we
considered the following two schemes (in addition to the related
work, HYDRA, introduced in Section 5.1) that do not consider any
period adaptation for security tasks.
• GLOBAL-TMax: In this scheme all the RT and security
tasks are scheduled using a global fixed-priority multicore
scheduling scheme [30]. Since our focus here is on
schedulability we set Ts = Tmaxs , ∀τs ∈ ΓS (recall that
a taskset can be considered schedulable if the following
conditions hold: Rr ≤ Dr ,∀τr ∈ ΓR and Rs ≤ Tmaxs ,∀τs ∈
ΓS ). This scheme allows us to observe the performance
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Figure 7: Impact on schedulability and security. (a) The acceptance ratio vs taskset utilizations for 2 and 4 core platforms: our
scheme outperforms HYDRA and GLOBAL-TMax approaches for higher utilizations. (b) Difference in period vectors for our
approach and reference schemes (e.g.,HYDRA, GLOBAL-TMax, HYDRA-TMax): the non-negative distance (y-axis in the figure)
implies that HYDRA-C finds shorter periods than other schemes.
impacts of binding RT tasks to the cores (due to legacy
compatibility).
• HYDRA-TMax: This is similar to the HYDRA approach
introduced in Section 5.1 (i.e., security tasks were partitioned
using best-fit allocation as before) but instead of minimizing
periods here we set Ts = Tmaxs ,∀τs . This allows us to
observe the trade-offs between schedulability and security
in a fully-partitioned system.
In Fig. 7a we compare the performance of HYDRA-C with the
HYDRA, GLOBAL-TMax and HYDRA-TMax strategies in terms
of acceptance ratio (y-axis in the figure) defined as the number
of schedulable tasksets (e.g., Rs ≤ Tmaxs ,∀τs ) over the generated
one and the x-axis shows the normalized utilization UM . As we
can see from the figure, HYDRA-C outperforms HYDRA when the
utilization increases (i.e., UM > 0.2). This is because our scheme
allows security tasks to execute in parallel across cores and also
allocate periods considering the schedulability constrains of all
low priority tasks – this results in a smaller response time and
can find more tasksets that satisfy the designer specified bound.
In contrast HYDRA uses a greedy approach that minimizes the
periods of higher priority tasks first without considering the global
state. Also HYDRA statically binds the security task to the core and
hence suffers interference from the higher priority tasks assigned
to that core – this leads to lower acceptance ratios. For higher
utilizations (i.e., UM ≥ 0.7) HYDRA-C can find tasksets schedulable
that can not be easily partitioned by using the HYDRA-TMax
scheme. The acceptance ratio of our method and the HYDRA-
TMax scheme is equal when UM < 0.7. This is because, for lower
utilizations some lower priority security tasks experience less
interference due to longer periods and specific core assignment
(recall we set Ts = Tmaxs for all security tasks). While we bind
the RT tasks to cores (due to legacy compatibility), it does not
affect the schedulability (i.e., the acceptance ratio of HYDRA-C
is higher when compared to the GLOBAL-TMax scheme). This is
because, RT tasks are already schedulable when partitioned (e.g.,
by assumption on taskset generation, see Section 5.2.1) and our
analysis reduces the interference that RT tasks have on security
ones. For higher utilizations, the acceptance ratio drops for all the
schemes since it is not possible to satisfy all the constraints due to
the high interference from RT and security tasks. We also highlight
that while our approach results in better schedulability, HYDRA-
C/HYDRA-TMax (i.e., where legacy RT tasks are partitioned to
the cores) and GLOBAL-TMax (i.e., where all tasks can migrate)
schemes are incomparable in general (e.g., there exists taskset that
may be schedulable by task partitioning but not in global scheme
where migration is allowed and vice-versa) – we allow security
tasks to migrate due to security requirements (e.g., to achieve faster
intrusion detection – as we explain in the next experiments, see
Fig. 7b).
In the final set of experiments (Fig. 7b) we compare the achievable
periods (in terms of Euclidean distance) for our approach and the
other schemes. The x-axis in the Fig. 7b shows the normalized
utilizations and the y-axis represents the average difference
between the following period vectors: (a) between HYDRA-C and
HYDRA (dashed line); (b) HYDRA-C and other strategies (e.g.,
GLOBAL-TMax and HYDRA-TMax) that do not consider period
minimization (dotted marker) for dual and quad core setup. Higher
distance values imply that the periods calculated by HYDRA-C
are smaller (i.e., leads to faster detection time) and our approach
outperforms the other scheme. For low to medium utilizations
(e.g., 0.2 ≤ U ≤ 0.5) HYDRA-C performs better when compared to
HYDRA. In situations with higher utilizations, the lesser availability
of slack time results in HYDRA-C and HYDRA performing in a
similar manner. Also, for higher utilizations HYDRA is unable to
find schedulable tasksets and hence there exist fewer data points.
Our experiments also show that compared to GLOBAL-TMax
and HYDRA-TMax our approach finds smaller periods in most cases
(Fig. 7b). This is expected since there is no period adaptation (i.e.,
we set Ts = Tmaxs for those schemes). However it is important
to note that HYDRA-C achieves better execution frequency (i.e.,
smaller periods) without sacrificing schedulability as seen in Fig. 7a.
That is, our semi-partitioned approach achieves better continuous
monitoring when compared with both a fully-partitioned approach
(HYDRA, HYDRA-TMax) and a global scheduling approach
(GLOBAL-TMax) while providing the same or better schedulability.
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6 DISCUSSION
In this paper we do not design for any specific security tasks (the
IDS system used is meant for demonstration purposes only) and
allow designers to integrate their preferred techniques. Depending
on the actual implementation of the security tasks some attack
may not be detectable. For instance, the system may be vulnerable
to zero-day attacks if the security tasks are not designed to
detect unforeseen exploits or anomalous behaviors. There exists
cases where security tasks may require some amount of system
modifications and/or porting efforts – say a timing behavior based
security checking [11, 28, 52] may require the insertion of probing
mechanisms inside the RT application tasks (or additional hardware)
so that security tasks can validate their expected execution profiles.
HYDRA-C abstracts security tasks (and underlying monitoring
events) and works in a proactive manner. However, designers may
want to integrate security tasks that react, based on anomalous
behavior. For instance, let at time t , j-th job of task τs (e.g., τ js )
performs action a0 (e.g., runtime of real-time tasks). Because of
intrusions (or perhaps due to other system artifacts) in time [t , t+Ts ]
(Ts is the period of τs ), job τ j+1s finds that a0 is not behaving as
expected. Therefore τ j+1s may perform both actions, a0 and a1 (say
that checks the list of system calls, to see if any undesired calls
are executed). One way to support such a feature is to consider
the dependency (i.e., a1 depends on a0 in this case) between
security checks (e.g., sub-tasks). We intend to extend our framework
considering dependency between security tasks.
7 RELATEDWORK
RT Scheduling and Period Optimization. Although not in the
context of RT security, the scheduling approaches present in this
paper can be considered as a special case of prior work [53] where
each task can bind to any arbitrary number of available cores.
For a given period, this prior analysis [53] is pessimistic for the
model considered by HYDRA-C (i.e., RT tasks are partitioned and
security tasks can migrate on any core) in a sense that it over-
approximates carry-in interference from the tasks bound to single
cores (e.g., RT tasks) and hence results in lower schedulability (e.g.,
identical to the GLOBAL-TMax scheme in Fig. 7a). Researchers also
propose various semi-partitioned scheduling strategies for fixed-
priority RTS [35, 54]. However, this work primarily focuses on
improving schedulability (e.g., by allowing highest priority task
to migrate) and they are not designed for security requirements
in consideration (e.g., minimizing periods and executing security
tasks with fewer interruption for faster anomaly detection). There
exists other work [55] in which the authors statically assign the
periods for multiple independent control tasks considering control
delay as a cost metric. Davare et al. [56] propose to assign task and
message periods as well as satisfy end-to-end latency constraints
for distributed automotive systems. While the previous work focus
on optimizing period of all the tasks in the system for a single
core setup, our goal is to ensure security without violating timing
constraints of the RT tasks in a multicore platform.
Security Solutions for RTS. In recent years researchers proposed
various mechanisms to provide security guarantees into legacy
and non-legacy RTS (both single and multicore platforms) in
several directions, viz., integration of security mechanisms [25–
27], authenticating/encrypting communication channels [7–10,
14, 57], side-channel defence techniques [15, 58–61] as well as
hardware/software-based frameworks [11–13, 62–65].
Perhaps the closest line of research is HYDRA [26] where authors
proposed to statically partition security tasks to the cores and
used an optimization-based solution to obtain the periods. While
this approach does not have the overhead of context switches
across cores, as we observed from our experiments (Section 5),
that scheme results in a poor acceptance ratio for larger utilizations,
and suffers interference from other high priority tasks leading to
slower detection of intrusions (i.e., less effective). The problem
of integrating security for single core RTS is addressed in prior
research [25] where authors used hierarchical scheduling [66] and
proposed to execute security tasks with a low priority server. This
approach is also extended to a multi-mode framework [27] that
allows security tasks to execute in different modes (i.e., passive
monitoring with lowest priority as well as exhaustive checking
with higher priority). These server-based approaches, however,
may require additional porting efforts for legacy systems.
There exists recent work [9, 10] to secure cyber-physical
systems fromman-in-the-middle attacks by enabling authentication
mechanisms and timing-aware network resource scheduling.
There has also been work [7, 8, 14] where authors proposed
to add protective security mechanisms into RTS and considered
periodic task scheduling where each task requires a security
service whose overhead varies according to the required level
of service. The problem of designing secure multi-mode RTS
have also been addressed in prior work [57] under dynamic-
priority scheduling. In contrast, we consider a multicore fixed-
priority scheduling mechanism where security tasks are executed
periodically, across cores, while meeting real-time requirements.
The above mentioned work are designed for single core platforms
and it is not straightforward to retrofit those approaches for
multicore legacy systems.
In another direction, the issues related to information leakage
through storage timing channels using shared architectural
resources (e.g., caches) is introduced in prior work [15, 58, 59]. The
key idea is to use a modified fixed-priority scheduling algorithm
with a state cleanup mechanism to mitigate information leakage
through shared resources. However, this leakage prevention comes
at a cost of reduced schedulability. Researchers also proposed to
limit inferability of deterministic RT schedulers by randomizing
the task execution patterns. Yoon et al. [60] proposed a schedule
obfuscation method for fixed-priority RM systems. A combined
online/offline randomization scheme [61] is also proposed to reduce
determinism for time-triggered (TT) systems where tasks are
executed based on a pre-computed, offline, slot-based schedule.
We highlight that all the aforementioned work either requires
modification to the scheduler or RT task parameters, and is designed
for single core systems only.
Unlike our approach that works at the scheduler-level,
researchers also proposed hardware/software-based architectural
solutions [11–13, 62–65, 67] to improve the security posture of
future RTS. Those solutions require system-level modifications
and are not suitable for legacy systems. To our knowledge this
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is the first work that aims to achieve continuous monitoring for
multicore-based legacy RT platforms.
8 CONCLUSION
Threats to safety-critical RTS are growing and there is a need
for developing layered defense mechanisms to secure such
critical systems. We present algorithms to integrate continuous
security monitoring for legacy multicore-based RTS. By using our
framework, systems engineers can improve the security posture
of RTS. This additional security guarantee also enhances safety –
which is the main goal for such systems.
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